Rashi wishes to prevent any misunderstanding, and so makes it
absolutely clear that the twelve loaves should be divided evenly
between two stacks; we should not think that the words {Hebrew Ref} be taken as meaning that there should be "two
stacks [and] six stacks" or "two loaves on each of six stacks" (M.,
G.A., N.Y.). The twelve loaves of showbread were placed on the Table
every week, but arranged with supports so that they did not lie on top
of each other and become stale. The kohanim who were on duty for
the week would eat it afterwards.
358 That is, the very top
of the table, as Rashi proceeds to explain.
359 The vertical
tubes which supported the horizontal tubes upon which the loaves
actually rested.
360 Sifra Emor, per. 18, 4, Menochos 97a, and see Rashi on
Shemos 25, 29 for the shape of the showbread and the construction of
the supports.
361 Or: next to; see next note.
362
That is, there were two bowls in all, one on each stack, not that there
were two bowls on each one of the two stacks. From Rashi's description
it might be thought that the bowls should be put "on each one of the
two stacks," thus breaking the top breads, and perhaps more; however,
since the Torah went to great lengths to prevent the loaves from
getting stale, it is unlikely that it would allow them to be broken
(see M.L.). However, this is by no means clear. In the Mishnah
(Menochos 96a) there is a dispute between the Sages and Abba Sho'ul on
this matter. Abba Sho'ul interprets the word {Hebrew Ref} , "on" in
its alternate sense of "nearby, next to," as in Bemidbor 2, 20, as
does Rabbi in Menochos 98a, and the Sifra in per. 18, 6; the Sages of
the Mishnah interpret {Hebrew Ref} in its more usual sense, and
insist that the bowls were placed on the tops of the two stacks of
bread. M. assumes that Rashi follows the opinion of the Sages in the
Mishnah, but M.L. points out that Rashi is merely citing the Mishnah,
and it is not clear that which opinion he was following --- {Hebrew Ref}
in Rashi too can mean "next to"! On the other hand, G.A. argues that
Rashi was indeed following the opinion of the Sages in the Mishnah,
since the more usual meaning of {Hebrew Ref} is "on" and that is
the plain meaning of the verse.
363 As in the case of the
meal-offering of Vayikro 2, 2, from which Sifra learns this by a
gezeroh shovoh, the use of two identical or similar expressions
(M., see Sifra Emor, per. 18, 7).
364 Rashi wishes to point
out that the use of a feminine verbal form, literally, "and she shall
be," excludes several possibilities. It cannot refer to loaves of
verse 5, for that would require a plural, {Hebrew Ref} , nor can it
refer to the word {Hebrew Ref} , "bread," as a general designation
for the loaves, as in verse 7, for that would require a masculine
singular, {Hebrew Ref} . It must therefore refer only to the
frankincense, which is a feminine singular noun (B.Y.). Moreover, the
use of this verb indicates that the frankincense, though divided into
two bowls, is considered as one "memorial portion," and so both
must be burnt, and if one is lost, the other cannot be offered.
This halachah is recorded in Menochos 27a, and here Rashi
implies the source for it (Shem Olom, D.H.).
365 See Sifra Emor, per. 18, 7.
366 The
feminine singular verb, {Hebrew Ref} , cannot refer to anything but
the frankincense or memorial portion, both of which are feminine nouns.
But here neither is possible, since neither can be eaten by the
kohanim, as the verse specifies. Therefore, the only possibility is
that the verb refers to the "meal-offering," {Hebrew Ref} , a
feminine noun, even though we never find the showbread called a
meal-offering (see B.Y. and N.Y.).
367 The word {Hebrew Ref}
, "bread," is masculine and thus agrees with the suffix -hu (
{Hebrew Ref} , "and they shall eat it"); otherwise it
would be -oh ( {Hebrew Ref} ). Thus, when the verse refers
to the same object---the bread, in the feminine, as in the feminine
verb, {Hebrew Ref} , "it shall belong," at the beginning of this
verse, the verb refers to another aspect of the bread, it status as a
{Hebrew Ref} , a meal-offering, which is a feminine noun (B.Y.).
368 Or: his eternity, i.e., his portion in the next world, since
the verse before mentions the phrase "an eternal portion" (M.K.), and
certainly by becoming guilty of a capital crime he lost this world
(N.Y.).
369 Literally, "warm."
370 Since it was baked before Shabbos on Friday and not
eaten until before the next Shabbos, the ninth day.
371
Actually, this is nothing more than our equivalent of a question-mark,
indicating that the previous sentence should be read as a question and
not a statement.
372 His mother's tribe.
373
Literally, "they said to him."
374 Literally, "What is
your nature [=origin] [to be] here?"
375 In the Torah, in
Bemidbor 2, 2. The point is that tribal descent is only reckoned from
the father, and not the mother; since his father was an Egyptian, he
actually had no tribe, though he was Jewish because of his mother.
376 I.e., they ruled against him; he had no case.
377
Sifra Emor, par. 14, 1, Vayikro Rabbo 32. According to the Mishnah
(Sanhedrin 7, 5): "The blasphemer is not liable until he pronounces
the Name clearly. Everyone [but the judges, witnesses and condemned]
are told to leave the court room and the judges speak to the oldest of
them [=the witnesses], and say to him: 'Say explicitly what you heard
[and not just by title].' And he says [what he heard]; the judges rise
and rend [their garments at the blasphemous words, to express their
dismay that G-d's Name has been treated so disrespectfully in their
presence], and they do not repair [the tear in their garments]. The
second [witness] says: 'And I too [heard the same],' and [so too] the
third [witness, if there is one] says: 'And I too [heard the same].'
378 Ibid. He is called "an Egyptian man," rather than
merely "an Egyptian," to indicate that he was the same "Egyptian
man" of Shemos 2, 11 who was beating the Hebrew slave, and whom Moshe
killed (G.A.).
379 Since the verse emphasizes that he was
"in the midst" of the Israelites. However, this is difficult, since
as the son of a Jewish mother he should not have had to convert. The
Ramban notes that the French scholars suggest that the halochoh
that the child of a Jewish mother is Jewish even
if the father is not was not in effect before Mattan Torah.
Since this person was born before Mattan Torah, he
was not considered Jewish and had to convert. The Ramban himself
suggests that this Egyptian converted along with the rest of the Jewish
people at Sinai, with the sprinkling of the blood and immersion; but
what need was there for Rashi to mention this? P.Y., quoting
She'elos Uteshuvos Beis Yitzchok, suggests that Rashi does indeed
hold the opinion that a child born of a Jewish mother and a non-Jewish
father is not automatically Jewish and needs conversion (Kiddushin
46b).
380 As Rashi explained above, the argued over where
this half-Egyptian could pitch his tent among the Danites.
381
That is, the Name that is properly applied only to G-d. The noun {Hebrew Ref} can be either holy or profane, depending on whether it is
applied to G-d or to idols; the {Hebrew Ref} , the four-letter
Name (Tetragrammaton), can only refer to Him.
382 That is,
the Proper Name; both terms refer to the same Name of G-d.
383
Sifra Emor, par. 14, 2. Malbim suggests that since Rashi (see on verse
12 below) explains that he and the man who profaned the Shabbos by
gathering wood (see Bemidbor 15, 32--36) were caught at approximately
the same time, this incident would have occurred before Mattan
Torah, during the first year after the Exodus; how then could he
have heard the Proper Name at Sinai? Malbim therefore suggests that the
proper reading in Rashi (and the Sifra) is not {Hebrew Ref} , "that
he heard," but {Hebrew Ref} , "that they heard,"
referring to the Israelites. This assumes a scribal error both in Rashi
and the Sifra, with no evidence in early editions or manuscripts.
However, E.H. points out that the dating of this incident to the first
year itself is not without its difficulties, since the showbread was
part of the service in the Tabernacle, and that did not begin until the
second year, after the Tabernacle was erected. Likewise, the
encampment was not organized until then either. He therefore suggests
(following M. and Hiz.) that the encampment was informally organized
according to tribes during the first year, and a commandment regarding
the
showbread was given then as well, even though the Tabernacle was
not yet built. However, this does not solve the problem raised by the
Malbim. Altogether, the solution proposed by D.D. seems to solve all
these. D.D. suggests that these two aggodos cited are
conflicting; that the opinions that this half-Egyptian mocked the
showbread or that he was prevented from pitching his tent with the
Danites do not also hold that this incident occured at the same time as
that of the wood-gatherer. That incident occurred during the first
year, while the Egyptian blasphemed during the second. On the other
hand, the one who holds that they did take place at the same time,
during the first year, holds the first reason Rashi cites above for the
Egyptian's blasphemy, namely, that he lost his share in this world and
perhaps the next by blaspheming, a sin even for Noachides, and so
applicable even before Mattan Torah, but not because of any
dispute over his place in the camp. There is therefore no contradiction
between a date in the first year and the reason for his blasphemy.
384 She allowed an Egyptian man to have relations with her.
However, Rashi himself in his comments to Shemos 2, 11 observes that
she thought the Egyptian was her husband; why does he then call her a
"wayward woman" here? Indeed, the Egyptian was the slavedriver that
Moshe killed, and the Hebrew slave he was beating was the husband of
Shelomis: During the night he woke him (her husband) and forced him to
leave the house. [The Egyptian then] returned and entered the house and
came upon the wife, while she thought that he was her husband. The
[Israelite] man returned home and sensed what had occurred. When that
Egyptian realized that he sensed what had happened, he beat and
terrorized him the entire day." Why then is she called a "wayward
woman"? Because what attracted the Egyptian to her was her chatter
(N.Y., D.H.). Legally, too, even rape by a non-Jew disqualifies a woman
from marrying a kohein, and the child is genealogically
defective (M., D.D., G.A.).
385 Literally, "Peace be on
you." The third is in the plural. The word "peace" ( {Hebrew Ref} )
was always on her lips, and that is why the Torah calls her
"Shelomis."
386 And thus the Torah calls her {Hebrew Ref} , connecting Divri with {Hebrew Ref} , "to speak."
387 In this case, of course, the blasphemer
could not cause disgrace to his father, who was either unknown or not
with the Israelites. Rashi here states a general rule, one which
applies to his next example, that of Oholiov, who was a credit to his
father and his tribe.
388 Shemos 31, 6.
389 Sifra
Emor, par. 14, 4. Thus, when Oholiov helped Betzalel construct the
Tabernacle, his good work gained credit for himself, for his father and
his tribe, who are also mentioned in the verse.
390 The verb
{Hebrew Ref} is used, instead of sim or nosan to
indicate that he was placed there alone, since it has this nuance
(B.B.).
391 Rashi wishes to explain why it was that they
were not placed together; the reason is that one does not place one
guilty of a more heinous with one guilty of a less severe one (N.Y.).
392 Of the four modes of execution given to a Jewish court:
stoning, burning (which is not "burning at the stake" which involves
prolonged agony, and is against Jewish law), beheading with a sword and
strangulation. The last did not involve hanging, as in done by
non-Jews, but by having two cloths wrapped around the condemned
person's neck, strangling him from both sides simultaneously (Sanhedrin
52b). Morever, before execution, the prisoner was drugged (Sanhedrin
43a). It should be borne in mind that the death penalty was hardly ever
carried out; "a court which sentences a person to death [as often as]
once in seventy years is called an injurious court" (Makkos 7b).
393 Bemidbor 15, 33.
394 In our verse.
395
Sifra Emor, par. 14, 5; Sanhedrin 78b. The question arises: how could
he be condemned to death, inasmuch as he had not been given the proper
hasro'oh, the proper warning, which should include an inkling
that he will be condemned to death if he proceeds on the course of
action he seems to be taking. How could he be given proper warning if
the witnesses who warned him did
not know what penalty faced him? This is all the more difficult
according to R. Yehudoh, who holds that not only must he be notified
that he will be liable to the death penalty if he carries out his
intended action, but he must be told just which mode of
execution he is letting himself in for. Many answers have been proposed
for this. N.Y. suggests that this was a horo'as sho'oh, a
decision meant to meet the circumstances of that particular time, and
not according to the standard Halochoh; a court has that right.
G.A. theorizes that the witnesses warned him that he was liable to
whatever punishment G-d chose to mete out to him, and that was
sufficient. B.B. points out that this incident occurred before
Mattan Torah, and so warning was not required.
396 Who
actually heard the blasphemous words, and not merely those who heard
about the incident (B.Y.).
397 The word "all" as usual
comes to include something or someone else.
398 Who have to
hear from the witnesses exactly what the blasphemer said. The verse
thus lists all those who are legally required to be involved with the
sentence and execution (B.Y.). See Sifra Emor, per. 19, 1.
399
Sifra Emor, per. 19, 2. Why did the witnesses place their hands on the
head of the blasphemer? D.H. explains that this was the very first
execution carried out by a court, and the witnesses were reluctant to
testify, since they considered it perhaps sinful to cause the death of
another human being through their testimony; they were therefore
instructed to place their hands on his head in order to demonstrate
that he himself had caused his own death by his crime.
400
That is, though it is impossible that the entire congregation
stone the blasphemer, and only a comparative handful did it, it is
considered as though all had done so (L.B., see Sifra).
401 Death in one's fifties without surviving offspring.
402 Sanhedrin 56a. G-d's "titles" are non-specific Names
by which He is known, such as {Hebrew Ref} , "Lord," {Hebrew Ref} , "Merciful" and the like.
403 In verse 11 Rashi
explained the word {Hebrew Ref} , whose root is n-k-v, as
"to pronounce clearly," and here he explains it as "to curse." M.
points out that Radak in his dictionary noted that the root actually
has both meanings: "to curse while pronouncing the Name distinctly."
And that is why Rashi states (in his comments to verse 11): "that he
clearly pronounced the Proper Name, and blasphemed." As Rashi notes
here, in Bemidbor 23, 28 it has the meaning "to curse." And indeed,
it also means "to pronounce clearly" in Bemidbor 1, 17, "Moshe and
Aharon took these men whose names were clearly pronounced." Still, one
might think that merely pronouncing the Proper Name of G-d might
warrant the death penalty, and so the Sages point out that verse 14
make clear the reason for the blasphemer's execution: "Take the
blasphemer...and the entire congregation shall stone him." He is
stoned because of his blaspheming (cursing). Why then does the Torah
change its terminology, and use two different words within the same
paroshoh? Both actions were required to condemn him: he must curse,
and while cursing, pronounce the Name clearly.
404 Bemidbor
23, 8; Sanhedrin 56a.
405 Shemos 21, 12.
406 Which includes women, who are not men, and
minor children who are not (adult) men. Rashi cites this Midrosh in his
comments to Shemos 21, 12, but here he shortens it somewhat, omitting
the end, which points out that this excludes a minor who kills, since
our verse begins: "Any man who kills." M.L. wonders why, since
Rashi took the trouble to repeat the midrosh, why he did not
quote it completely, but leaves the question unanswered. L.B. suggests
that Rashi wanted only to reconcile the two verses here, without going
into all the details.
407 Literally, "be placed in him."
408 That is, we appraise his worth as a slave before he was
injured, and his worth now; the difference is the payment. There are
also other payments required, for the time he is unable to work (
sheves), for the cost of the medical care required (rippui),
for the pain (tza'ar) and the shame (boshes) (M.).
409
And therefore it refers to monetary compensation and not wounding
the person who caused the injury in the same way he injured the
plaintiff; Bovo Kammo 84a, Kesubos 32b.
410 Since verse 18 states: "Whoever smites an
animal fatally," with the word nefesh, "soul" modifying
"smites" while here the word nefesh does not appear (M.).
411 Literally, "is not said."
412 Since otherwise
we do not exact the death penalty for a wound which is not fatal.
413 To pay compensation for the damage.
414 In this
case, of course, he is liable to the death penalty.
415 In
short, the fact that these two cases are juxtaposed means that we can
compare them in both directions: just as a penalty is exacted for
wounding a live animal, but not a dead one,
so too with one's parents---one who strikes a parent's dead body
and causes a laceration, G-d forbid, is not liable to the death
penalty; on the other hand, just as one who strikes an animal without
causing a wound is not liable for paying compensation, so one who
strikes a parent when the parent is alive but does not cause a
laceration is not liable to the death penalty, though of course he has
violated a number of negative and positive commandments; Sifra Emor,
per. 20, 8; Sanhedrin 84a-b.
416 Literally, "designate."
417 See Rashi on Shemos 19, 12, and see Rashi on Devorim 21,
22.
418 As is stated in Shemos 19, 13: "He will be stoned
or cast down," which Rashi interprets as meaning: "From here we learn
that those who are stoned are first pushed down from the stoning place
from a height that is twice that of a man."
419 As stated
in Shemos 19, 12: "for he will be stoned." If he dies from the fall,
no further action is necessary, and he is stoned only until he dies;
see Sanhedrin 45a-b.
420 As specified in Devorim 21, 22:
"When a man is...executed, you shall hang him on a gallows [for just a
moment]," regarding which Rashi notes: "Our Rabbis said [that] all
those stoned are [then] hung." See Sifra Emor, per. 20, 10; Sanhedrin
45b, where the Rabbis hold that only blasphemers and idolators are
subject to this debasement (M. on Devorim 21, 22, who explains that
Rashi adopts a minority view, that of R. Eliezer, because it is closer
to the plain meaning of the verse). Rashi's comment here comes to
explain the expression "Bnei Yisroel did just as Ad-noy commanded
Moshe," which cannot refer to the stoning alone, since that was
already stated at the beginning of the verse. This clause must
therefore refer to more than that (B.Y.).
Return to Main Search Form
Sources